Systems and methods for detecting sensitive information leakage while preserving privacy

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods for privacy-preserving data loss detection include performing a sweep of online information for a candidate data leakage to generate an online data set; performing an analysis of the online data set to determine that the online information is a candidate data leakage; the host encrypting the data communication and providing the host-encrypted data communication to a software agent at the enterprise; in response to receiving the host-encrypted data communication, the software agent encrypting a database of enterprise information and re-encrypting the host-encrypted data communication, and providing the same to the host; the host decrypting a host-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypted data communication to generate a software agent-encrypted data communication; determining whether a match exists between the encrypted database of information and the software agent-encrypted data communication; and based on whether the match exists, the software agent taking a first action or the host taking a second action.

BACKGROUND

Field

The subject matter discussed herein relates generally to methods andsystems of detecting leakage of sensitive information while alsopreserving privacy, and more particularly, to a protocol between anexternal host and an enterprise to detect large-scale data leakage in amanner that protects private information.

Related Art

In the related art, online information breach associated with sensitiveuser data is occurring with growing scale and cost. For example,enterprises that are online entities, such as retailers, insurers andgovernment agencies, may experience large-scale loss (or leakage) ofsensitive information associated with individual users. For example, athird party may steal (e.g., hack) a credit card number, social securitynumber, or account information, publicly display the sensitiveinformation, or attempt to sell the sensitive information in anunauthorized manner.

The breaches associated with sensitive data leakage are large (e.g.,millions of online user accounts) in scale and occur rapidly, and cancause losses to the online entity (e.g., enterprise) as well as theindividual user. Further, it may be difficult or impossible for theenterprise itself to detect the leakage. Even if the leakage isdetected, there can be a significant time delay between the leakageevent and the detection of the leakage event.

To address the foregoing problem, related art approaches may beemployed. For example, the entity (e.g., enterprise such as an onlineretailer or agency, but not limited thereto) may contact a host andprovide the host with an indication of online data loss. For example,but not by way of limitation, the enterprise may indicate to the hostthat it believes that credit card numbers may have been leaked from theclient, and would like the host to determine whether a leak hasoccurred.

In response to the request, the related art host may be able to searchfor the credit card numbers online, but cannot do so in aprivacy-preserving manner. Further, as explained above, there is a timegap between the breach and the enterprise becoming aware of the breach.Additionally, some online enterprises are not able to detect the breachusing their own monitoring tools.

Accordingly, a need exists for the enterprise to be able to have a hostquickly make the determination as to whether there has been a data loss(e.g., large-scale), without provide the host without the actualsensitive information, with the host not knowing the source of the dataloss, so as to preserve privacy.

SUMMARY

The subject matter includes computer-implemented methods for detectingdata leakage, including a computer-implemented method of detecting dataleakage, the method comprising performing, by a host external to afirewall of an enterprise, a sweep of online information for a candidatedata leakage to generate an online data set; the host performing ananalysis of the online data set to determine that the online informationis a candidate data leakage, based on a context of the online data; thehost encrypting the data communication and providing the host-encrypteddata communication to a software agent at the enterprise; in response toreceiving the host-encrypted data communication, and by using a commonencryption key, the software agent encrypting a database of enterpriseinformation and re-encrypting the host-encrypted data communication;providing the software agent-encrypted database of enterprisecommunication and the re-encrypted data communication to the host; thehost decrypting a host-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypted datacommunication to generate a software agent-encrypted data communication;performing a matching operation to determine whether a match existsbetween the encrypted database of information and the softwareagent-encrypted data communication; for the match determined to exist,the host reporting the match to the software agent, and the softwareagent taking a first action; and for the match determined to not exist,the host taking a second action.

The subject matter also includes the software agent at the enterprisenot being provided with a key used by the host encrypting the datacommunication originating from the online account, and the host notbeing provided with the common encryption key of the software agent.

According to the subject matter, the performing the matching operationcomprises applying a privacy preserving set intersection algorithm.Further, the host partially encrypts the data communication, and leavesan unencrypted portion of the data communication as cleartext, andprovides the partially encrypted data communication and the cleartext tothe software agent.

Additionally, according to the subject matter, the software agent addsnoise into the encrypted database and sends the encrypted database withthe noise to the host. Also, the sweep of online information is a websweep of the Internet, and the web sweep of the Internet is at aprescribed period.

Further, the subject matter includes the software agent re-orderingvalues in the host-encrypted data communication during the re-encryptionof the host-encrypted data communication. Additionally, the hostreporting the match to the software agent comprises the host providingthe software agent with at least one of a number of matches, theencrypted matching candidate leaked information, and informationassociated with a source of the candidate data leakage.

The subject matter further includes the information being associatedwith a source of the candidate data leakage comprises at least one of aUniform Resource Locator (URL) identified during the web sweep as thesource of the candidate data leakage, and metadata associated with theURL.

The subject matter is also directed to a computer-implemented method ofdetecting data leakage at a host external to a firewall of anenterprise, the method comprising performing, by a host external to afirewall of an enterprise, a sweep of online information for a candidatedata leakage to generate an online data set; the host performing ananalysis of the online data set to determine that the online informationis a candidate data leakage, based on a context of the online data;encrypting the data communication, and providing the host-encrypted datacommunication to a software agent at the enterprise; receiving asoftware agent-encrypted database of enterprise communication and thehost-encrypted data communication, re-encrypted by the software agent;decrypting a host-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypted datacommunication to generate a software agent-encrypted data communication;performing a matching operation to determine whether a match existsbetween the encrypted database of information and the softwareagent-encrypted data communication; for the match determined to exist,reporting the match to the software agent; and for the match determinedto not exist, the host taking an action.

According to the subject matter, the performing the matching operationcomprises applying a privacy preserving set intersection algorithm.

Further, according to the subject matter, the host reporting the matchto the software agent comprises the host providing the software agentwith at least one of a number of matches, the encrypted matchingcandidate leaked information, and information associated with a sourceof the candidate data leakage.

Additionally, the subject matter includes the sweep of onlineinformation that is a web sweep of the Internet, and the web sweep ofthe Internet that is at a prescribed period.

A computer-implemented method of detecting data leakage from anenterprise having a software agent, the method comprising:

receiving, from a host external to a firewall of the enterprise, ahost-encrypted data communication that originated from an online sourceassociated with a candidate data leakage;

using a common encryption key, encrypting a database of enterpriseinformation and re-encrypting the host-encrypted data communication;

providing the encrypted database of enterprise communication and there-encrypted data communication to the host;

receiving a report from the host indicative of a match existing betweenthe encrypted database of information and the re-encrypted datacommunication; and

taking a first action.

According to the subject matter, the software agent at the enterprise isnot provided with a key used by the host encrypting the datacommunication originating from the online account, and the host is notprovided with the common encryption key of the software agent.

The subject matter also includes the software agent adding noise intothe encrypted database and sending the encrypted database with the noiseto the host.

Further, the subject matter includes the software agent re-orderingvalues in the host-encrypted data communication during the re-encryptionof the host-encrypted data communication.

According to the subject matter, the first action by the software agentcomprises providing an alert to an authority that the data leakage isassociated with the enterprise.

The subject matter also includes a system for detecting data leakage ata host external to a firewall of an enterprise, including the hostexternal to the firewall of the enterprise including a hardwareprocessor and having executable instructions stored on acomputer-readable medium, the instructions at the host comprising,performing, by a host external to a firewall of an enterprise, a sweepof online information for a candidate data leakage to generate an onlinedata set; the host performing an analysis of the online data set todetermine that the online information is a candidate data leakage, basedon a context of the online data; encrypting the data communication, andproviding the host-encrypted data communication to a software agent atthe enterprise; receiving a software agent-encrypted database ofenterprise communication and the host-encrypted data communication,re-encrypted by the software agent; decrypting a host-encrypted aspectof the re-encrypted data communication to generate a softwareagent-encrypted data communication; performing a matching operation todetermine whether a match exists between the encrypted database ofinformation and the software agent-encrypted data communication; for thematch determined to exist, reporting the match to the software agent;and for the match determined to not exist, the software agent taking afirst action; and the enterprise including a hardware processor andhaving executable instructions stored on a computer-readable mediumreceiving, from the host external to a firewall of the enterprise, thehost-encrypted data communication; using a common encryption key,encrypting a database of enterprise information and re-encrypting thehost-encrypted data communication, and providing the softwareagent-encrypted database and the re-encrypted data communication to thehost; receiving a report from the host indicative of the match existingbetween the encrypted database of information and the softwareagent-encrypted data communication; and taking a second action.

Further, according to the subject matter, the software agent at theenterprise is not provided with a key used by the host encrypting thedata communication originating from the online account, and the host isnot provided with the common encryption key of the software agent.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows a system with a client and a host having a protocolaccording to an example implementation.

FIG. 2 shows an example for the protocol according to the exampleimplementation.

FIG. 3 shows an example process of the protocol including the client andthe host according to an example implementation.

FIG. 4 shows an example process of the protocol including the hostaccording to an example implementation.

FIG. 5 shows an example process of the protocol including the clientaccording to an example implementation.

FIG. 6 shows an example environment suitable for some exampleimplementations.

FIG. 7 shows an example computing environment with an example computingdevice associated with the external host for use in some exampleimplementations.

FIG. 8 shows an example computing environment with an example computingdevice associated with the client for use in some exampleimplementations.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The subject matter described herein is taught by way of exampleimplementations. Various details have been omitted for the sake ofclarity and to avoid obscuring the subject matter. The examples shownbelow are directed to structures and functions for implementing systemsand methods for data loss detection while preserving privacy.

Aspects of the example implementations are directed to allowing a client(e.g., enterprise, such as a retailer or government agency) to determinewhether sensitive information associated with users of the client hasbeen leaked (e.g., stolen). For example, the data leak may be alarge-scale data leak (e.g., millions of accounts). The determination ismade by a host, without the client revealing the sensitive informationto the host, and without the host providing any potentially sensitiveinformation resulting from the determination process to be provided tothe client.

For example, but not by way of limitation, the example implementationmay include a client that is an online entity such as an enterprise withusers that have provided sensitive information to the enterprise. Forexample, the enterprise may be an online retailer, and the user may be acustomer that makes purchases from the website of the online retailerusing electronic payment, such as by credit card, debit card, mobiledevice payment system, or other manner of payment as would be understoodby those skilled in the art. Alternatively, the enterprise may an agency(e.g., tax, motor vehicles, health care), and the user may beindividuals that have online transactions with that agency that includesensitive information (e.g., social security number, driver's licenseinformation, insurance account numbers, medical conditions). The clientmay be a user of online hosting services provided by the host (e.g.,cloud computing or online application platform), or the client may notbe a user of the online hosting services at all.

In the example implementation, the host includes an engine that performsan online search for the sensitive information of the client in the data(e.g., documents) associated with the host. The data associated with thehost may be internal (e.g., stored in a cloud-based service andassociated with the client) or external (e.g., online and publiclyavailable on the Internet). For example, a web sweep of available onlinedata, without limitation to the location being associated with theclient or the host, may be performed to perform context aware patternmatching to detect potentially sensitive information at a location onthe Internet (e.g., URL) indicative of a data leakage event. In theexample implementation, the identity of the party responsible for thedata leak (e.g., bad actor such as a hacker) may not be known, andinformation on potentially responsible parties may also not beavailable.

Further, the client includes an agent that may run in the secureenvironment of the client (including a secure online environment of thehost). The agent is operative to facilitate a secure set intersectionprotocol, as explained in further detail below. Similarly, the host alsoincludes a component that facilitates the secure set intersectionprotocol. A user interface (UI) is also provided, to allow the client toprovide information (e.g., settings for sensitive information to beprotected), and to provide results of the determination to the user(e.g., data leak or data theft information).

Additional aspects of the example implementations relate to systems andmethods for detecting and/or preventing data leakage, loss oroversharing, including classic pattern matching and context awaresensitive information detection with assistance from the party underprotection. The systems and methods are performed in an automatic,privacy preserving manner. For example, but not by way of limitation,the example systems and methods may employ cryptography, including butnot limited to, privacy preserving set intersection algorithms. Morespecifically, a privacy preserving set intersection algorithm may be analgorithm or a method that allows for the determination of anintersection of two (or more) sets of data belonging to differentparties, without either party gaining knowledge of the other party'sfull data set.

In the related art, a first Company A would like to provide a dataleakage detection service (e.g., identifying loss of sensitive data suchas but not limited to corporate credit card numbers associated withcompany B). Company A may be able to detect information on the Internetthat looks like the sensitive information associated with Company B(e.g., users or account holders for Company B). However, the informationthat is available on the Internet also includes information that is notthe sensitive information (e.g., noise).

The unauthorized leak of information such as credit card numbers and/orsocial security numbers as determined by Company A may, if provided toCompany B, expose personal, sensitive information to company B. WhileCompany B could address the foregoing issue by providing Company A withthe database of corporate credit card numbers to detect, such an actionwould expose the private sensitive information of Company B to CompanyA.

According to the example implementations, a privacy preserving setintersection protocol is employed. In the foregoing example, Company Aonly shares encrypted results with company B (e.g., without sharing thekey), and Company B only shares encrypted corporate card numbers withCompany A without sharing its key. Depending on the implementation ofthe privacy preserving set intersection protocol, the result is thenumber of elements present in both sets, the list of exact elementspresent in both sets, and/or information associated with the source ofthe elements (e.g., uniform resource locator (URL) of a third partywebsite where Company A found the information in the search process,with the third party website being the source of the stolen sensitiveinformation that is displayed or sold online).

Thus, the sets themselves are not revealed to either party. As a result,the privacy of individual users and Company A is preserved, as theactual information associated with the web sweep and pattern matchingfor the findings is not reported to company B, and the privacy ofCompany B is also preserved, as the corporate card database is notshared with Company A.

An example use case that implements the above-explained naive protocolas provided as follows. While the specific data and context are providedherein for illustrative purposes, the present example implementationsare not limited thereto, and other data and/or contexts may besubstituted therefor without departing from the inventive scope.Further, while credit card numbers are used for explanatory purposes,the example implementations are not limited thereto, and other sensitivedata for which the privacy should be protected may be substitutedtherefor, including, but not limited, account identifiers,government-issued accounts (e.g., driver's license or social securitynumber information), or other sensitive information, as would understoodby those skilled in the art.

In a first operation, Company A (e.g., the host) performs an analysis ofthe Internet, searching of numbers that appear to be the sensitive data.For example, Company A may perform a search of the Internet for allcredit card-like numbers or social security-like numbers.

As a result of the analysis, two candidate credit card numbers areidentified from a third-party website, 1111 and 2112. This circumstancemay be due to the third party accessing the online information in anunauthorized manner, or of an individual with access to the sensitiveinformation providing the sensitive data to the third party. Thus, thesensitive information has been leaked, and is available on the Internet.Accordingly, Company A's web sweep identifies and compiles candidatedata leakage information.

Then, Company A performs an encryption of the each of the members of thecandidate data leakage information using key A, to generate A(1111),A(2111), and sends the encrypted candidate data leakage information toCompany B as A(1111), A(2111). Thus, Company B does not receive any ofthe values of the candidate data leakage information, but only receivesthe encrypted values. As a result, Company B receives an encryptedversion (using key A) of the candidate credit card numbers that mayinclude data leakages.

Accordingly, Company B (e.g., the client) retrieves the database of itscorporate card numbers (e.g., 2111, 2112 and 2113), and encrypts theinformation in the database on key B to generate B(2111), B(2112),B(2113), using a cipher with commutative properties. Accordingly,Company B sends Company A the following result: B(2111), B(2112),B(2113). Thus, Company A does not receive the true (e.g., cleartext)identity of the credit card numbers, but only encrypted versions of thecredit numbers. Additionally, Company B also encrypts, using key B, theencrypted candidate data leakage information that it had received fromCompany A, as B(A(1111)), B(A(2111)), and sends this result to CompanyA.

After receiving B(2111), B(2112), B(2113), and B(A(1111)), B(A(2111)),Company A removes its own encryption from the double-encrypted elementsB(A(1111)) and B(A(2111)), to generate B(1111) and B(2111). Company Acan then compare the elements that it decrypted with respect to key A(e.g., B(1111) and B(2111)) to the elements that it received fromcompany B (e.g., B(2111), B(2112), B(2113)). Based on this comparison,Company A determines that B(1111) is not present in both sets, andB(2111) is present in both sets. In other words, the credit card number(2111) was present in Company A's search results detected during the websweep, as well as in the database of accounts of Company B, whereas theother credit card numbers (2112) and (2113) in Company B's database wasnot found in Company A's search results, and Company A's search resultsincluded (1111), which is not a credit card number associated withCompany B.

After completion of the comparison and determination of the matchingvalue, Company A provides Company B with the result, which may include anumber of “hits”, the encrypted values themselves (in this case, B(2111)and B(2112)), or other information, such as the URL where the candidatedata leakage information was found, or related metadata. Since Company Aruns the web sweep on a regular (e.g., daily) basis, historicalinformation about past candidate data leakage information associatedwith the URL may also be reported to Company B. If there are no hits,this is indicative of Company B not having any potential data leakage.If there are hits, this may be indicative of Company B having apotential data leakage. If the sweep is performed on a regular basis(e.g., daily), historical data can be created that can be used byCompany B to observe trends and perform data analysis.

The trend analysis may provide indirect indications of data leakage. Forexample, but not by way of limitation a subset of the sensitiveinformation (e.g., some of the card numbers) may have already be leakedin the past, and new leaks may not necessarily expose all sensitive data(e.g., all of the card numbers) that leaked online. By performing trendanalysis as compared with the raw number of hits, leak events detectionmay be improved.

For example, but not by way of limitation, a client (e.g., company) mayhave 1 million account numbers in its database, and only five accountnumbers are determined by the host to be exposed online on a daily basisas a historical average. However, on a particular day, fifteen accountnumbers may have been exposed online and detected by the host. Such adeviation from the historical trend may provide an indication of apotential data leakage of the sensitive information.

Alternatively, the particular account numbers that are detected by thehost may be different, even if the same overall number of accountnumbers is detected on a given day. In the foregoing example, if thehistorical trend of the daily average is five account numbers beingdetected per day, one or more of those five account numbers may berepeated. If, on a given day, the actual numbers of the five detectedaccount numbers are different from the historical trend of detectedaccount number. Alternatively, there may be five account numbersdetected by the host on average, and those five numbers may berepeating. However, if on one of the days, the five numbers that aredetected are different from the five numbers that are repeating, such adeviation from the historical trend may provide an indication of apotential data leakage of the sensitive information.

Because Company B has the crypto key B, it can determine that the creditcard numbers identified by Company A as candidate data leakageinformation, include (2111). However, Company A does not have, andcannot determine, the database of B's corporate card numbers, andCompany B does not have any actual information associated with theencrypted results provided by Company A that do not match its corporatecard numbers.

The foregoing example use case may include additional optional aspects.For example, only certain characteristics of findings (e.g., last 4digits of credit card numbers) may be sent from Company A to Company, Bto prevent the need to encrypt and transmit the entire database of cardnumbers. Further, random noise may be added to the findings by CompanyA, to prevent information leakage from Company A to Company B.Additionally, the order of elements could be adjusted so as to preventcompany A from determining which finding represents a corporate card.According to another alternate example implementation, a client mayemploy Bloom filters, particularly if there is a substantially largeamount of sensitive information in the candidate data leakage asdetected by the host and passed to the client in encrypted form usingthe host-side key (e.g., key A).

It is noted that although it is not required for these exampleimplementations, Company A may optionally host one or more onlineservices for Company B, or may also more generally be a host (e.g.,cloud services provider) for Company B, and may thus host services,applications and data (e.g., Company A is a cloud host for Company B).However, even in such an environment, Company A cannot access theCompany B's information that is considered to be inside the “firewall”of Company B. For example, but not by way of limitation, an encryptionapproach may be employed to create a firewall for Company B, whenCompany A is hosting Company B.

FIG. 1 illustrates a system 100 according to an example implementation.More specifically, a client 101 (e.g., an enterprise, but not limitedthereto) and a host 103 (e.g., a service provider, but not limitedthereto) are coupled via a network such as the Internet 105. The host103 includes a host server 107, context aware pattern matching 109,privacy preserving set intersection comparator 111,encryption/decryption engine 113, and action rules 115. The client 101includes an agent 117, client information 119, encryption/decryptionengine 121, and action rules 123. The host 103 is not within thefirewall of the client 101. According to the protocol, some operationsare performed by the agent 117 at the client 101, and other operationsare performed by the host server 107 at the host 103. Additionally, athird party 125 that is not authorized by the client 101 may engage inunauthorized data leakage activity, such as hacking, and may obtainsensitive information of the client 101, and make the informationavailable on the internet 105, such as by publishing and/or offering forsale.

In the system 100, publicly available information on the Internet 105,is scanned by the host server 107 of the host 103 on a regular basis(e.g., daily, but not limited thereto). For example, but not by way oflimitation, the host server 107 is executing a well-known method ofsweeping the web to identify information that appears to be sensitiveinformation. For example, but not by way of limitation, the host server107 employs context aware pattern matching 109 to perform acontext-based analysis of the information on the Internet, to search forcandidates of leaked information. For example, but not by way oflimitation, the context aware pattern matching 109 may attempt to lookfor patterns (e.g., number of consecutive characters or the values of apart or all of the consecutive characters). Optionally, the host 103 mayperform the analysis to find the candidate leakage information by theapplication of the above-noted Bloom filter.

For the candidate leaked information determined by the web sweepperformed by the host server 107 using the context aware patternmatching 109, the encryption/decryption engine 113 is employed toencrypt the candidate leaked information based on a key that is at thehost 103; the key at the host 103 is not provided to the client 101. Thehost 107 then provides the encrypted candidate leaked information to theagent 117 of the client 101.

The agent 117, upon receiving the encrypted candidate leakedinformation, applies the encryption/decryption engine 121 to perform asecond encryption of the received, once-encrypted candidate leakedinformation, and also encrypts client information 119 (e.g., a databaseof the client information). The agent 117 has access to the clientinformation 119, and is resident in the environment of the client 101(e.g., cloud space of client 101, as hosted by the host 103, or anotherhost). The encryption/decryption engine 121 uses a different key that isat the client 101 and this different key is not provided to the host103. The agent 117 sends the twice-encrypted candidate leakedinformation and the encrypted client information to the host 103 via anetwork such as the Internet 105.

The host server 107, upon receiving the twice-encrypted candidate leakedinformation and the encrypted client information, performs a decryptionoperation, via the encryption/decryption engine 113, on thetwice-encrypted candidate leaked information, to remove the encryptionthat it had initially applied. As a result, the encrypted candidateleaked information and the encrypted client information, both encryptedby the client 101, remains at the host 103.

The host server 107 then applies the privacy preserving set intersectioncomparator 111 to perform a matching operation on the values of theencrypted candidate leaked information and the encrypted clientinformation.

If a match is determined to exist as a result of the matching operation,the host server 107 provides a report to the agent 117 of the client 101that includes a number of matches, the encrypted matching candidateleaked information, and/or information associated with the source of thecandidate data leakage (e.g., the URL and associated metadata). Theagent 117 applies action rules 123 to determine an action to be taken,as explained in greater detail below. If a match is determined to notexist as a result of the matching operation, action rules 115 areapplied, and the host 103 takes an action, as explained in greaterdetail below.

As noted above, in response to receiving the host-encrypted datacommunication, and by using a common encryption key, the software agent117 may encrypt a database of enterprise information and re-encrypt thehost-encrypted data communication, and provide the softwareagent-encrypted database of enterprise communication and there-encrypted data communication to the host 103. The host may decrypt ahost-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypted data communication to generatea software agent-encrypted data communication, and perform a matchingoperation to determine whether a match exists between the encrypteddatabase of information and the software agent-encrypted datacommunication.

For the match determined to exist, the host 103 may provide a report tothe software agent 117, and the software agent 117 may take a firstaction based on the report. As explained above, the report may include anumber of matches, the encrypted matching candidate leaked information,and/or information associated with the source of the candidate dataleakage (e.g., the URL and associated metadata).

The action by the software agent 117 may include reviewing the number ofmatches, and if the number of matches exceeds a threshold, determiningthat a data leakage event has occurred. However, the review is notlimited to determining whether the number of matches exceeds athreshold, and other analytic approaches may be substituted therefor, orused in conjunction with the foregoing review.

For example, by not by way of limitation, instead of (or in addition to)comparing the number of matches to a threshold, the number of matchesmay be compared to a historical average of the number of hits per dayover the entire history of the analysis period, or some subset thereof(e.g., previous number of days, weeks or months; average for that day ofthe week, month, or year; or other subset as would be understood bythose skilled in the art).

Further, according to another example implementation, an analysis may beperformed with respect to information other than the number of matches.For example, the number of sites (e.g., URLs), as detected by the host,that publish the same leaked sensitive information, or a change in thenumber of sites, as detected by the host, that publish the same leakedsensitive information, may provide information indicative of a leakageof sensitive information. Such information may be useful ininvestigation of the data leakage, such as by an enforcement authorityand/or the client.

The software agent 117, automatically and/or based on a manual reviewstep, may generate and provide an alert to the relevant authority (e.g.,credit card-associated company, bank, law enforcement agency, licenseissuing agency, or other authority as would be understood by thoseskilled in the art). Further, an administrator of the client 101 may bealerted that a leak may have taken place. However, the exampleimplementation is not limited thereto, and other actions in response toa data leakage as would be understood by those skilled in the art may besubstituted therefor without departing from the inventive scope.

For the match determined to not exist, the host 103 may take a secondaction. The second action by the host 103 may include not providing areport to the software agent 117.

As noted above, the software agent at the client 101 (e.g., enterprise)is not provided with a key used by the host 103 encrypting the candidatedata leakage information, and the host 103 is not provided with thecommon encryption key of the software agent 117.

According to an example implementation, the 103 host may partiallyencrypt the data communication, and leaves an unencrypted portion of thedata communication as cleartext. Further, the host 103 may provide thepartially encrypted data communication and the cleartext to the softwareagent. As a result, the processing requirements may be reduced, becausethe entire string of every candidate leaked information need not beencrypted, transmitted and decrypted between the host 103 and the client101.

As noted above, the software agent 117 may add noise into the encrypteddatabase and send the encrypted database with the noise to the host 103.Similarly, the software agent 117 may re-order values in thehost-encrypted data communication during the re-encryption of thehost-encrypted data communication. Taking such an approach may make itmore difficult for the host 103 to obtain information about the actualcontent of the database, particularly if the sample size is small.

The foregoing example implementations may be directed to variousentities, and for use in various environments. Examples of types ofusages of the example implementations are provided below. However, theseexample implementations are not intended to be limiting, and otherenvironments may be substituted therefor, as would be understood bythose skilled in the art.

For example, but not by way of limitation, the foregoing exampleimplementations may be directed to a consumer retailer that conductsonline transactions (e.g., credit card purchase of retail goods and/orservices by an online user). The sensitive information that isassociated with the online transactions may include, but is not limitedto, credit card information, bank account information, and onlineinformation associated with the user (e.g., user profile, password,demographic information, user purchase preferences, or the like).

Additionally, the example implementation may be directed to an onlineentity such as an identity theft agency. According to this exampleimplementation, the identity theft agency may match data associated withtheir customers, to assist in detection of online account theft. Theonline customers of the identity theft agency may include, but are notlimited to, users that have requested the identity theft agency toperform protect user-selected information (e.g., credit card number,social security number, phone number, bank account information, userequipment information such as International Mobile Equipment Identity(IMEI) number, or the like).

Further, the example implementation may be directed to internalenvironments of the online entity, such as an online corporateenvironment. For example, but not by way of limitation, an organizationmay employ the example implementation to search online, in aprivacy-preserving manner, for internal information that may be leaked.Such information may include, but is not limited to, trade secrets,internal project names or project codes, or other confidentialinformation.

Also, the example implementation may be directed to an onlineapplication developer. The online application developer may have abackend for the online application that interacts with users. Forexample, but not by way of limitation, in the context of an online game,the backend may aggregate information associated with the identity,score and performance of users, and may include statistics that onlineusers may wish for the application developer to keep private. Onlineuser may wish for such information, as well as information associatedwith purchase patterns, usage patterns and other online userinformation, to be kept private.

The example implementation may also include a situation where the hostis performing a web sweep of the Internet and providing results andreports for more than one company. In such a situation, each company mayhave its own agreement with the host as to the content of the report.For example, one company may require only the number of matches, andanother company may require the number of matches, as well asinformation on the source URL of the data leak. The host may use rulesor rule bases that can be updated by the company with respect to thecontent of the report. Further, the company may run diagnostics on thedata provided by the host to the company. For example, the host mayinform the company as to the percentage of total hits that are includedin the company's database, so that the company can determine theproportion of the data leakage that is associated with the company. Thecompany may then apply filtering or perform other diagnostics on theanalytical information provided by the host. The host may also providethe company with a dashboard-style interface that provides the companywith a detailed visual indication of the diagnostic information,including historical data based on past web sweeps.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a use case 200 according to theforegoing example implementation. At 201, a provider, implementing theforegoing example implementation as well as the processes describedbelow and in FIGS. 3-6, has found candidate account numbers bearing thevalues “1111” and “2111”, as the result of the search of the Internet(e.g., web sweep).

At 203, a client company has a database of corporate numbers thatinclude values “2111”, “2112” and “2113”. The client company at 203 hasnot been provided the above-noted information of the provider at 201,and the provider at 201 has also not been provided the above-notedinformation of the client company at 203.

At 205, the provider encrypts the candidate account numbers on key A,and provides the encrypted values A(1111), A(2111) to the clientcompany. At 207, the client company encrypts the values in its databaseof corporate numbers on key B, which is different from key A, andprovides the encrypted values B(2111), B(2112), B(2113) to the provider.Additionally, the client company encrypts the encrypted candidateaccount numbers A(1111), A(2111) using key B, and provides the resultB(A(1111)), B(A(2111)) to the provider.

At 209, the provider removes the encryption on key A, so as to obtainB(1111), B(2111). The provider then finds an intersection between thesevalues B(1111), B(2111) and the encrypted corporate numbers B(2111),B(2112), B(2113). The provider sends the client company a report thatmay include a number of matches, the encrypted matching candidate leakedinformation as intersection B(2111), and/or information associated withthe source of the candidate data leakage (e.g., the URL and associatedmetadata). The client company decrypts B(2111), and can thus determinethat 2111 is the relevant account number.

FIG. 3 illustrates a process 300 according to an example implementationof the system 100. At 301, a search of a pool of online information isperformed to obtain candidates of leaked information. For example, butnot by way of limitation a web sweep of the Internet may be performed toobtain this information. At 303, once received, the results of theobtaining operation of 301 are provided for a context aware patternmatching operation that is performed (e.g., a context-based analysis) onthe results of the web sweep, to search for candidates of leakedinformation.

At 305, if no candidate leaked information is found in the outgoingdata, the process is ended (e.g., the host has determined that there isno sensitive data leak on the Internet, based on the web sweep). If theweb sweep result is determined to include candidate leaked informationat 305, then the process proceeds to 307.

At 307, the candidate leaked information is encrypted, based on a keythat is at the host and is not provided to the client, and the encryptedcandidate leaked information is provided to the client. For example, at309, an agent (e.g., a software program at the client that performsinstructions for the client) may receive the encrypted candidate leakedinformation.

At 311, the agent uses a key to perform a second encryption of thereceived, once-encrypted candidate leaked information, and also encryptsclient information (e.g., the database of the client information). Thekey that is used by the agent is not provided to the host, and thus, thehost cannot decrypt the content that was encrypted by the agent. Also at311, the agent provides the twice-encrypted candidate leaked informationand the encrypted client information to the host.

At 313, the host receives the twice-encrypted candidate leakedinformation and the encrypted client information, performs a decryptionoperation so as to remove the encryption that it initially applied onthe twice-encrypted candidate leaked information.

At 315, a matching operation is performed (e.g., by privacy preservingset intersection comparator) on the values of the encrypted candidateleaked information and the encrypted client information.

At 317, it is determined whether one or more match has been found. If amatch is determined to exist as a result of the matching operation at317, then at 319 the host provides a report to the agent that includes anumber of matches, the encrypted matching candidate leaked information,and/or information associated with the source of the candidate dataleakage (e.g., the URL and associated metadata), and the agent appliesdetermines an action to be taken, as explained above. If a match isdetermined to not exist as a result of the matching operation at 317,then at 321 the host optionally takes an action, as explained above.

FIG. 4 illustrates a process 400 according to an example implementationof the host 103. At 401, a search of a pool of information is performedto obtain candidates of leaked information. For example, but not by wayof limitation a web sweep of the Internet may be performed to obtainthis information. At 403, once received, the results of the obtainingoperation of 401 are provided for a context aware pattern matchingoperation that is performed (e.g., a context-based analysis) on theresults of the web sweep, to search for candidates of leakedinformation.

At 405, if no candidate leaked information is found in the outgoingdata, the process is ended (e.g., the host has determined that there isno sensitive data leak on the Internet, based on the web sweep). If theoutgoing data is determined to include candidate leaked information at405, then the process proceeds to 407.

At 407, the candidate leaked information is encrypted (e.g., leak ofdata on the Internet), based on a key that is at the host and is notprovided to the client, and the encrypted candidate leaked informationis provided to the client (e.g., an agent at the client).

At 409, the host receives twice-encrypted candidate leaked informationand the encrypted client information, which has been encrypted using akey that is not available to the host. For example, but not by way oflimitation, an agent may use a key to perform a second encryption of thereceived, once-encrypted candidate leaked information, and also encryptsclient information (e.g., the database of the client information). Thekey that is used by the agent is not provided to the host, and thus, thehost cannot decrypt the content that was encrypted by the agent.

At 411, the host performs a decryption operation so as to remove theencryption that it initially applied on the twice-encrypted candidateleaked information.

At 413, a matching operation is performed (e.g., by the privacypreserving set intersection comparator) on the values of the encryptedcandidate leaked information and the encrypted client information.

At 415, it is determined whether a match has been found. If a match isdetermined to exist as a result of the matching operation at 415, thenat 417 the host provides a report to the agent that includes a number ofmatches, the encrypted matching candidate leaked information, and/orinformation associated with the source of the candidate data leakage(e.g., the URL and associated metadata), and the agent appliesdetermines an action to be taken, as explained above. If a match isdetermined to not exist as a result of the matching operation at 415,then at 419 the host optionally takes an action, as explained above.

FIG. 5 illustrates a process 500 according to an example implementationof the client 101. At 501, an agent at the client receives encryptedcandidate leaked information from a host. The agent, and the client forthat matter, are not able to access the key that was used to encrypt thecandidate leaked information, and thus cannot determine the actual valueof the candidate leaked information.

At 503, the agent uses a key to perform a second encryption of thereceived, once-encrypted candidate leaked information, and at 505encrypts client information (e.g., the database of the clientinformation). The key that is used by the agent is not provided to thehost, and thus, the host cannot decrypt the content that was encryptedby the agent.

At 507, the agent provides the twice-encrypted candidate leakedinformation and the encrypted client information to the host.

At 509, the agent receives a report from the host that includes a numberof matches, the encrypted matching candidate leaked information, and/orinformation associated with the source of the candidate data leakage(e.g., the URL and associated metadata), and the agent appliesdetermines an action to be taken, as explained above.

At 511, the agent applies determines an action to be taken, as explainedabove.

In some examples, the foregoing processes illustrated in FIGS. 3-5 maybe implemented with different, fewer, or more blocks. Processes 300,400, and/or 500 may be implemented as computer executable instructions,which can be stored on a medium, loaded onto one or more processors ofone or more computing devices, and executed as a computer-implementedmethod.

FIG. 6 shows an example environment suitable for some exampleimplementations. Environment 600 includes devices 605-645, and each iscommunicatively connected to at least one other device via, for example,network 660 (e.g., by wired and/or wireless connections). Some devicesmay be communicatively connected to one or more storage devices 630 and645.

An example of one or more devices 605-645 may be computing devices 705and/or 805 described below in FIGS. 7 and 8, respectively. Devices605-645 may include, but are not limited to, a computer 605 (e.g., alaptop computing device), a mobile device 610 (e.g., smartphone ortablet), a television 615, a device associated with a vehicle 620, aserver computer 625, computing devices 635-640, storage devices 630 and645.

In some implementations, devices 605-620 may be considered user devicesassociated with the users of the enterprise (e.g., devices used by usersto access services and/or issue requests, such as on a social network,or to access their personal online information while within the firewallof the enterprise). Devices 625-645 may be devices associated withservice providers (e.g., used by the external host to provide servicesas described above and with respect to FIGS. 3-5, and/or store data,such as webpages, text, text portions, images, image portions, audios,audio segments, videos, video segments, and/or information thereabout).

For example, by not by way of limitation, a user (e.g., Alice) who isnot authorized by an enterprise having user device 605 or 610 on anetwork supported by one or more devices 625-645, may have accessed,viewed, and/or shared sensitive information in an unauthorized manner,and made such information available on the Internet, using user device605 or 610 if Alice is leaking the data from inside the enterprise, oranother user device 615. A recipient that is the host (e.g., Bob) mayaccess and/or view Alice's shared sensitive information (e.g., candidateleaked information) using device 620, in accordance with the processdescribed above with respect to FIGS. 3-5.

FIG. 7 shows an example computing environment with an example computingdevice associated with the external host for use in some exampleimplementations. Computing device 705 in computing environment 700 caninclude one or more processing units, cores, or processors 710, memory715 (e.g., RAM, ROM, and/or the like), internal storage 720 (e.g.,magnetic, optical, solid state storage, and/or organic), and/or I/Ointerface 725, any of which can be coupled on a communication mechanismor bus 730 for communicating information or embedded in the computingdevice 705.

Computing device 705 can be communicatively coupled to input/userinterface 735 and output device/interface 740. Either one or both ofinput/user interface 735 and output device/interface 740 can be a wiredor wireless interface and can be detachable. Input/user interface 735may include any device, component, sensor, or interface, physical orvirtual, that can be used to provide input (e.g., buttons, touch-screeninterface, keyboard, a pointing/cursor control, microphone, camera,braille, motion sensor, optical reader, and/or the like). Outputdevice/interface 740 may include a display, television, monitor,printer, speaker, braille, or the like. In some example implementations,input/user interface 735 and output device/interface 740 can be embeddedwith or physically coupled to the computing device 705. In other exampleimplementations, other computing devices may function as or provide thefunctions of input/user interface 735 and output device/interface 740for a computing device 705.

Examples of computing device 705 may include, but are not limited to,highly mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, devices in vehicles and othermachines, devices carried by humans and animals, and the like), mobiledevices (e.g., tablets, notebooks, laptops, personal computers, portabletelevisions, radios, and the like), and devices not designed formobility (e.g., desktop computers, other computers, information kiosks,televisions with one or more processors embedded therein and/or coupledthereto, radios, and the like).

Computing device 705 can be communicatively coupled (e.g., via I/Ointerface 725) to external storage 745 and network 750 for communicatingwith any number of networked components, devices, and systems, includingone or more computing devices of the same or different configuration.Computing device 705 or any connected computing device can befunctioning as, providing services of, or referred to as a server,client, thin server, general machine, special-purpose machine, oranother label.

The I/O interface 725 may include wireless communication components (notshown) that facilitate wireless communication over a voice and/or over adata network. The wireless communication components may include anantenna system with one or more antennae, a radio system, a basebandsystem, or any combination thereof. Radio frequency (RF) signals may betransmitted and received over the air by the antenna system under themanagement of the radio system.

I/O interface 725 can include, but is not limited to, wired and/orwireless interfaces using any communication or I/O protocols orstandards (e.g., Ethernet, 802.11x, Universal System Bus, WiMax, modem,a cellular network protocol, and the like) for communicating informationto and/or from at least all the connected components, devices, andnetwork in computing environment 700. Network 750 can be any network orcombination of networks (e.g., the Internet, local area network, widearea network, a telephonic network, a cellular network, satellitenetwork, and the like).

Computing device 705 can use and/or communicate using computer-usable orcomputer-readable media, including transitory media and non-transitorymedia. Transitory media include transmission media (e.g., metal cables,fiber optics), signals, carrier waves, and the like. Non-transitorymedia include magnetic media (e.g., disks and tapes), optical media(e.g., CD ROM, digital video disks, Blu-ray disks), solid state media(e.g., RAM, ROM, flash memory, solid-state storage), and othernon-volatile storage or memory.

Computing device 705 can be used to implement techniques, methods,applications, processes, or computer-executable instructions in someexample computing environments. Computer-executable instructions can beretrieved from transitory media, and stored on and retrieved fromnon-transitory media. The executable instructions can originate from oneor more of any programming, scripting, and machine languages (e.g., C,C++, C#, Java, Visual Basic, Python, Perl, JavaScript, and others).

Processor(s) 710 can execute under any operating system (OS) (notshown), in a native or virtual environment. One or more applications canbe deployed that include logic unit 760, application programminginterface (API) unit 765, input unit 770, output unit 775, sensitiveinformation determination unit 780, sensitive information encryptionunit 785, decryption and matching unit 790, action determination unit793, and inter-unit communication mechanism 795 for the different unitsto communicate with each other, with the OS, and with other applications(not shown). For example, sensitive information determination unit 780,sensitive information encryption unit 785, decryption and matching unit790 and action determination unit 793 may implement one or moreprocesses shown in FIGS. 3 and 4. The described units and elements canbe varied in design, function, configuration, or implementation and arenot limited to the descriptions provided.

In some example implementations, when information or an executioninstruction is received by API unit 765, it may be communicated to oneor more other units (e.g., logic unit 760, input unit 770, output unit775, sensitive information determination unit 780, sensitive informationencryption unit 785, decryption and matching unit 790, and actiondetermination unit 793).

For example, after input unit 770 has received the data associated withthe web sweep that searches the Internet for candidate leakedinformation, input unit 770 may use API unit 765 to communicate thecontent of the web sweep to sensitive information determination unit780. For example, sensitive information determination unit 780 may, byuse of context-based analysis, make a determination that the web sweepinformation includes candidate leaked information.

Sensitive information determination unit 780 may, via API unit 765,interact with the sensitive information encryption unit 785 to encryptthe candidate leaked information. Using API unit 765, sensitiveinformation determination unit 780 may interact with decryption andmatching unit 790 to receive and decrypt the twice encrypted candidateleaked information (e.g., from the client), so that encryption appliedby the sensitive information encryption unit 785 is removed, and thenperform a matching operation between the encrypted candidate leakedinformation and encrypted client database information, to determine thepresence of a match, and provide information to the agent that includesa number of matches, the encrypted matching candidate leakedinformation, and/or information associated with the source of thecandidate data leakage (e.g., the URL and associated metadata). Actiondetermination unit 793 may determine an action to be taken when it isdetermined that a match is not present by the decryption and matchingunit 790.

In some instances, logic unit 760 may be configured to control theinformation flow among the units and direct the services provided by APIunit 765, input unit 770, output unit 775, sensitive informationdetermination unit 780, sensitive information encryption unit 785,decryption and matching unit 790 and action determination unit 793 insome example implementations described above. For example, the flow ofone or more processes or implementations may be controlled by logic unit760 alone or in conjunction with API unit 765.

FIG. 8 shows an example computing environment with an example computingdevice associated with the enterprise for use in some exampleimplementations. Computing device 805 in computing environment 800 caninclude one or more processing units, cores, or processors 810, memory815 (e.g., RAM, ROM, and/or the like), internal storage 820 (e.g.,magnetic, optical, solid state storage, and/or organic), and/or I/Ointerface 825, any of which can be coupled on a communication mechanismor bus 830 for communicating information or embedded in the computingdevice 805.

Computing device 805 can be communicatively coupled to input/userinterface 835 and output device/interface 840. Either one or both ofinput/user interface 835 and output device/interface 840 can be a wiredor wireless interface and can be detachable. Input/user interface 835may include any device, component, sensor, or interface, physical orvirtual, that can be used to provide input (e.g., buttons, touch-screeninterface, keyboard, a pointing/cursor control, microphone, camera,braille, motion sensor, optical reader, and/or the like). Outputdevice/interface 840 may include a display, television, monitor,printer, speaker, braille, or the like. In some example implementations,input/user interface 835 and output device/interface 840 can be embeddedwith or physically coupled to the computing device 805. In other exampleimplementations, other computing devices may function as or provide thefunctions of input/user interface 835 and output device/interface 840for a computing device 805.

Examples of computing device 805 may include, but are not limited to,highly mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, devices in vehicles and othermachines, devices carried by humans and animals, and the like), mobiledevices (e.g., tablets, notebooks, laptops, personal computers, portabletelevisions, radios, and the like), and devices not designed formobility (e.g., desktop computers, other computers, information kiosks,televisions with one or more processors embedded therein and/or coupledthereto, radios, and the like).

Computing device 805 can be communicatively coupled (e.g., via I/Ointerface 825) to external storage 845 and network 850 for communicatingwith any number of networked components, devices, and systems, includingone or more computing devices of the same or different configuration.Computing device 805 or any connected computing device can befunctioning as, providing services of, or referred to as a server,client, thin server, general machine, special-purpose machine, oranother label.

The I/O interface 825 may include wireless communication components (notshown) that facilitate wireless communication over a voice and/or over adata network. The wireless communication components may include anantenna system with one or more antennae, a radio system, a basebandsystem, or any combination thereof. Radio frequency (RF) signals may betransmitted and received over the air by the antenna system under themanagement of the radio system.

I/O interface 825 can include, but is not limited to, wired and/orwireless interfaces using any communication or I/O protocols orstandards (e.g., Ethernet, 802.11x, Universal System Bus, WiMax, modem,a cellular network protocol, and the like) for communicating informationto and/or from at least all the connected components, devices, andnetwork in computing environment 800. Network 850 can be any network orcombination of networks (e.g., the Internet, local area network, widearea network, a telephonic network, a cellular network, satellitenetwork, and the like).

Computing device 805 can use and/or communicate using computer-usable orcomputer-readable media, including transitory media and non-transitorymedia. Transitory media include transmission media (e.g., metal cables,fiber optics), signals, carrier waves, and the like. Non-transitorymedia include magnetic media (e.g., disks and tapes), optical media(e.g., CD ROM, digital video disks, Blu-ray disks), solid state media(e.g., RAM, ROM, flash memory, solid-state storage), and othernon-volatile storage or memory.

Computing device 805 can be used to implement techniques, methods,applications, processes, or computer-executable instructions in someexample computing environments. Computer-executable instructions can beretrieved from transitory media, and stored on and retrieved fromnon-transitory media. The executable instructions can originate from oneor more of any programming, scripting, and machine languages (e.g., C,C++, C#, Java, Visual Basic, Python, Perl, JavaScript, and others).

Processor(s) 810 can execute under any operating system (OS) (notshown), in a native or virtual environment. One or more applications canbe deployed that include logic unit 860, application programminginterface (API) unit 865, input unit 870, output unit 875, databaseencryption unit 880, received data encryption unit 885, actiondetermination unit 890, and inter-unit communication mechanism 895 forthe different units to communicate with each other, with the OS, andwith other applications (not shown). For example, database encryptionunit 880, received data encryption unit 885, and action determinationunit 890 may implement one or more processes shown in FIGS. 3 and 5. Thedescribed units and elements can be varied in design, function,configuration, or implementation and are not limited to the descriptionsprovided.

In some example implementations, when information or an executioninstruction is received by API unit 865, it may be communicated to oneor more other units (e.g., logic unit 860, input unit 870, output unit875, database encryption unit 880, received data encryption unit 885,and action determination unit 890).

For example, after input unit 870 has received an encrypted candidateleaked information from the host, input unit 870 may use API unit 865 tocommunicate this information to the database encryption unit 880, whichencrypts the client information database. Database encryption unit 880may, via API unit 865, interact with the received data encryption unit885 to encrypt the encrypted candidate leaked information received fromthe host. Using API unit 865, action determination unit 890 maydetermine an action to be taken based on information received from thehost that may include a report that includes a number of matches, theencrypted matching candidate leaked information, and/or informationassociated with the source of the candidate data leakage (e.g., the URLand associated metadata).

In some instances, logic unit 860 may be configured to control theinformation flow among the units and direct the services provided by APIunit 865, input unit 870, output unit 875, database encryption unit 880,received data encryption unit 885, and action determination unit 890 insome example implementations described above. For example, the flow ofone or more processes or implementations may be controlled by logic unit860 alone or in conjunction with API unit 865.

Any of the software components described herein may take a variety offorms. For example, a component may be a stand-alone software package,or it may be a software package incorporated as a “tool” in a largersoftware product. It may be downloadable from a network, for example, awebsite, as a stand-alone product or as an add-in package forinstallation in an existing software application. It may also beavailable as a client-server software application, as a web-enabledsoftware application, and/or as a mobile application.

The example implementations may have various benefits and advantages.For example, but not by way of limitation, privacy may be preserved forthe member of the client (e.g., individual users), and privacy may alsobe preserved for the client and the host. Thus, data leakagedetermination can be provided without requiring reliance on a trustedexternal party (e.g., third party to process and be made aware of theactual content or cleartext of the outgoing data). As a result, privacyof the sensitive information is preserved. The example implementationsmay also be incorporated in a cloud-based environment, where cloudcomponents implementing the client side of the protocol may be deployedin a uniform, scalable manner.

The example implementations may have further benefits and advantages.For example, but not by way of limitation, the example implementationsmay overcome the related problems and/or disadvantages associated withthe host not being able to maintain the privacy of the sensitiveinformation by maintaining the privacy of the client information as wellas the privacy of the online candidate information. Further, the exampleimplementation may overcome the related art time lag problem by use of aweb crawler to reveal another party associated with the data leak (e.g.,online hackers that are attempting to sell the sensitive informationthat was obtained without authorization).

Accordingly, the candidate sensitive information resulting from theonline search by the host is correlated with encrypted sensitiveinformation provided by the client, but the sensitive information itselfis not provided to the host. Similarly, results of the determination(e.g., candidate data leak information) host are provided to the clientas encrypted candidate sensitive information (e.g., leaked sensitiveinformation of the client); however, the candidate sensitive informationitself is not provided to the host. This is accomplished by the use ofthe secure set intersection, as explained above.

In situations in which the systems discussed here collect personalinformation about users, or may make use of personal information, theusers (e.g., user at the enterprise having both work and non-workaccounts integrated together) may be provided with an opportunity tocontrol whether programs or features collect user information (e.g.,information about a user's social network, social actions or activities,profession, a user's preferences, or a user's current location), or tocontrol whether and/or how to receive content from the content serverthat may be more relevant to the user. In addition, certain data may betreated in one or more ways before it is stored or used, so thatpersonally identifiable information is removed. For example, a user'sidentity may be treated so that no personally identifiable informationcan be determined for the user, or a user's geographic location may begeneralized where location information is obtained (such as to a city,ZIP code, or state level), so that a particular location of a usercannot be determined. Thus, the user may have control over howinformation is collected about the user and used by a content server.

Although a few example implementations have been shown and described,these example implementations are provided to convey the subject matterdescribed herein to people who are familiar with this field. It shouldbe understood that the subject matter described herein may beimplemented in various forms without being limited to the describedexample implementations. The subject matter described herein can bepracticed without those specifically defined or described matters orwith other or different elements or matters not described. It will beappreciated by those familiar with this field that changes may be madein these example implementations without departing from the subjectmatter described herein as defined in the appended claims and theirequivalents.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer-implemented method of detecting dataleakage, the method comprising: performing, by a host external to afirewall of an enterprise, a sweep of online information for a candidatedata leakage to generate an online data set; the host performing ananalysis of the online data set to determine that the online informationis the candidate data leakage, based on a context of the online data;the host encrypting the data communication and providing thehost-encrypted data communication to a software agent at the enterprise;in response to receiving the host-encrypted data communication, and byusing a common encryption key, the software agent encrypting a databaseof enterprise information and re-encrypting the host-encrypted datacommunication; providing the software agent-encrypted database ofenterprise communication and the re-encrypted data communication to thehost; the host decrypting a host-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypteddata communication to generate a software agent-encrypted datacommunication; performing a matching operation to determine whether amatch exists between the encrypted database of information and thesoftware agent-encrypted data communication; for the match determined toexist, the host reporting the match to the software agent, and thesoftware agent taking a first action; and for the match determined tonot exist, the host taking a second action.
 2. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 1, wherein the software agent at the enterprise is notprovided with a key used by the host encrypting the data communicationoriginating from the online account, and the host is not provided withthe common encryption key of the software agent.
 3. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the performing thematching operation comprises applying a privacy preserving setintersection algorithm.
 4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1,wherein the host partially encrypts the data communication, and leavesan unencrypted portion of the data communication as cleartext, andprovides the partially encrypted data communication and the cleartext tothe software agent.
 5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1,further comprising the software agent adding noise into the encrypteddatabase and sends the encrypted database with the noise to the host. 6.The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the sweep of onlineinformation is a web sweep of the Internet, and the web sweep of theInternet is at a prescribed period.
 7. The computer-implemented methodof claim 1, further comprising the software agent re-ordering values inthe host-encrypted data communication during the re-encryption of thehost-encrypted data communication.
 8. The computer-implemented method ofclaim 1, wherein the host reporting the match to the software agentcomprises the host providing the software agent with at least one of anumber of matches, the encrypted matching candidate leaked information,and information associated with a source of the candidate data leakage.9. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, wherein the informationassociated with a source of the candidate data leakage comprises atleast one of a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) identified during the websweep as the source of the candidate data leakage, and metadataassociated with the URL.
 10. A computer-implemented method of detectingdata leakage at a host external to a firewall of an enterprise, themethod comprising: performing, by a host external to a firewall of anenterprise, a sweep of online information for a candidate data leakageto generate an online data set; the host performing an analysis of theonline data set to determine that the online information is thecandidate data leakage, based on a context of the online data;encrypting the data communication, and providing the host-encrypted datacommunication to a software agent at the enterprise; receiving asoftware agent-encrypted database of enterprise communication and thehost-encrypted data communication, re-encrypted by the software agent;decrypting a host-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypted datacommunication to generate a software agent-encrypted data communication;performing a matching operation to determine whether a match existsbetween the encrypted database of information and the softwareagent-encrypted data communication; for the match determined to exist,reporting the match to the software agent; and for the match determinedto not exist, the host taking an action.
 11. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 10, wherein the performing the matching operationcomprises applying a privacy preserving set intersection algorithm. 12.The computer-implemented method of claim 10, wherein the host reportingthe match to the software agent comprises the host providing thesoftware agent with at least one of a number of matches, the encryptedmatching candidate leaked information, and information associated with asource of the candidate data leakage.
 13. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 10, wherein the sweep of online information is a websweep of the Internet, and the web sweep of the Internet is at aprescribed period.
 14. A computer-implemented method of detecting dataleakage from an enterprise having a software agent, the methodcomprising: receiving, from a host external to a firewall of theenterprise, a host-encrypted data communication that originated from anonline source associated with a candidate data leakage; using a commonencryption key, encrypting a database of enterprise information andre-encrypting the host-encrypted data communication; providing theencrypted database of enterprise communication and the re-encrypted datacommunication to the host; receiving a report from the host indicativeof a match existing between the encrypted database of information andthe re-encrypted data communication; and taking a first action.
 15. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the software agent atthe enterprise is not provided with a key used by the host encryptingthe data communication originating from the online account, and the hostis not provided with the common encryption key of the software agent.16. The computer-implemented method of claim 14, further comprising thesoftware agent adding noise into the encrypted database and sending theencrypted database with the noise to the host.
 17. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 14, further comprising the softwareagent re-ordering values in the host-encrypted data communication duringthe re-encryption of the host-encrypted data communication.
 18. Thecomputer-implemented method of claim 14, wherein the first action by thesoftware agent comprises providing an alert to an authority that thedata leakage is associated with the enterprise.
 19. A system fordetecting data leakage at a host external to a firewall of anenterprise, the system comprising: the host external to the firewall ofthe enterprise including a hardware processor and having executableinstructions stored on a computer-readable medium, the instructions atthe host comprising, performing, by a host external to a firewall of anenterprise, a sweep of online information for a candidate data leakageto generate an online data set; the host performing an analysis of theonline data set to determine that the online information is thecandidate data leakage, based on a context of the online data;encrypting the data communication, and providing the host-encrypted datacommunication to a software agent at the enterprise; receiving asoftware agent-encrypted database of enterprise communication and thehost-encrypted data communication, re-encrypted by the software agent;decrypting a host-encrypted aspect of the re-encrypted datacommunication to generate a software agent-encrypted data communication;performing a matching operation to determine whether a match existsbetween the encrypted database of information and the softwareagent-encrypted data communication; for the match determined to exist,reporting the match to the software agent; and for the match determinedto not exist, the software agent taking a first action; and theenterprise including a hardware processor and having executableinstructions stored on a computer-readable medium receiving, from thehost external to a firewall of the enterprise, the host-encrypted datacommunication; using a common encryption key, encrypting a database ofenterprise information and re-encrypting the host-encrypted datacommunication, and providing the software agent-encrypted database andthe re-encrypted data communication to the host; receiving a report fromthe host indicative of the match existing between the encrypted databaseof information and the software agent-encrypted data communication; andtaking a second action.
 20. The system of claim 19, wherein the softwareagent at the enterprise is not provided with a key used by the hostencrypting the data communication originating from the online account,and the host is not provided with the common encryption key of thesoftware agent.